According to the Financial Times on Monday, US president Barack Obama personally warned Turkey that unless it modifies its stance on Iran and softens its rhetoric on Israel following the brutal Israeli assault on the Gaza bound aid flotilla in May, there is slim possibility that the US will be willing to sell Turkey much needed drone aircrafts.  

According to one senior official in the US administration, "The president has said to Erdogan that some of the actions that Turkey has taken have caused questions to be raised on the Hill [Congress] … about whether we can have confidence in Turkey as an ally. That means that some of the requests that Turkey has made of us, for example in providing some of the weaponry that it would like to fight the PKK will be harder for us to push through congress." Another US official in Washington said "They need to show that they take seriously American national security interests" and that Washington was looking at Turkish conduct and would then assess if there were "sufficient efforts that we can go forward with their request."

Turkish-Israeli relations became strained after Turkish criticism of Operation Cast Lead; the three week Israeli assault on a besieged Gaza Strip in which 1,400 Palestinians were killed including over 400 children. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's vocal condemnation of the assault as well as the blockade of the Strip keenly reflected the Turkish public's interest, horror and outrage at the incident, so much so that a Turkish soap was produced depicting Israeli soldiers as cold blooded killers. Turkey later called off a joint military training exercise with Israel who retaliated by humiliating the Turkish ambassador over the soap opera and causing further diplomatic tension. However, the greatest blow to relations came with Israel's assault on the Mavi Marmara in May and its killing of nine Turkish civilians in international waters. The strength of the Turkish public feeling over the flotilla incident which led to Turkey threatening to sever diplomatic relations with Israel cannot be overstated. Indeed, among the key demands made on Israel by Turkey relate to the Turkish public; that Israel apologise to the families of the victims and pay them compensation.  

This is not a simple matter of Obama making demands of Erdogan and Erdogan having the ability to simply implement them. Unlike certain Middle Eastern dictatorships more conducive to taking orders from the US, Turkey is a democracy. And in a mature democracy, such a decision is demonstrably not Erdogan's alone to make. Moreover, Israel is yet to meet all Turkish demands and as such the manifest outrage in Turkey over the way Israel has dealt with it persists. As such, Obama's demands are a tall order for a populist leader like Erdogan to meet and he should be able to appreciate better than most the impact of public opinion in a democracy; particularly given yesterday's surefooted backtracking over the support he gave for plans to build a mosque near ground zero following protests from the families of victims of 9/11.

At a time when Turkey is carving out a unique new role for itself in both the region and the world mirrored by a robust and independent diplomacy, Washington's purported ultimatum and its assertions that Turkey failed to act as an ally in the UN vote on Iran must beg the question for Turkey; what does being an ‘ally' of the US mean?  

That Israel has long advocated military strikes against Iran and even threatened unilateral action on the pretext of its nuclear enrichment programme is well known. For a reluctant US, sanctions were the next best option. However, in May Brazil and Turkey managed to broker a nuclear swap deal with Iran which would export uranium stockpiles to Turkey in exchange for a medical research reactor. Despite that the hard won deal was hailed a breakthrough and a first step in ending Iran's long-term standoff with the West, the US appeared to shrug it off leading an international move to reject it and pushed for tough new sanctions to be imposed on Iran.  

Given the reception this tripartite agreement received and what is at stake for Turkey in terms of its reputation and national prestige, it is highly unlikely that it will make a unilateral decision on Iran. Any decision made would have to take place within the context of the agreement. Besides, Turkey's considerable economic interests with Iran as well as their strategic importance in fighting the PKK would preclude it backing any sanctions.

As such, both US demands would be politically untenable for Turkey.

Moreover, while the US drones Turkey wants to purchase reflect real security concerns that grow more urgent with the imminent US withdrawal from Iraq next year and the escalation in PKK infiltration into Turkey from bases in neighbouring countries, particularly northern Iraq as well as their use of urban terrorism, Turkey is currently developing its own drone technology. Last month it unveiled the Anka; a surveillance drone capable of flying for 24 hours stretches and carrying out reconnaissance missions in the regions where the separatist are waging an insurgency. Not only would this allow Turkey independence from Israel which has hitherto supplied it with Heron drone crafts, but it will not be long before an armed version of the Anka, which already rivals the Heron, will be developed.  

While US intelligence cooperation has helped in their fight against the PKK, they cannot be isolated without assistance from neighbouring states which is one of the driving forces behind its outreach to them, including Iran, and which has brought with it political and economic prominence.  Turkey has demonstrated that while it remains a US ally, it is no longer willing to follow Washington unquestioningly at the expense of its national interest and security.

If the US ultimatum is viewed within the context of its looming mid-term congressional elections, it could be seen as an effort by Obama to shore up support and regain lost backing within congress. He needs to placate Israel as anger and disappointment in the Jewish community over his policies toward it have lead to fears that the Jewish vote will be lost along with campaign contributions from powerful pro-Israel lobby groups. With Turkey's current adversarial stance vis-à-vis Israel and fears that it is "turning east", perhaps Obama is unwilling to risk proposing a weapons sale that will face tough resistance on Capitol Hill.

Such a scenario implies that there is no discernible difference between American foreign policy in the Middle East and Israel's perceived security interests; a perception which to foment anti-American sentiment in the region and dumbfounds critical debate within the US over the need for it to step back from its "special" relationship with Israel and reassess policies which sideline its own national interest in favour of Israel.  

The US attitude stands in direct contrast to David Cameron who, in a recent visit to Turkey, sought to acknowledge that as both a European and Eastern state, it is a critical strategic and diplomatic ally. It reflects certain contempt but surely the US must realise that a stable, secure Turkey with strong relations with its neighbours is actually beneficial to the US as an ally. Perhaps the US ought to take a leaf out of Turkey's book and recognise that Israel has definitely become a strategic liability.